The walras algorithm calculates competitive equilibria via a distributed tatonnementlike process, in which agents submit single-good demand functions to market-clearing auctions. The algorithm is asynchronous and decentralized with respect to both agents and markets, making it suitable for distributed implementation. We present a formal description of this algorithm, and prove that it converges under the standard assumption of gross substitutability. W e relate our results to the literature on general equilibrium stability and some more recent w ork on decentralized algorithms. We present some experimental results as well, particularly for cases where the assumptions required to guarantee convergence do not hold. Finally, w e consider some extensions and generalizations to the walras algorithm.
excess demand in all other markets. Next consider the second market and likewise adjust its price to clear; then repeat the process for all remaining markets. At the end of each round, only the last market is guaranteed to be in equilibrium, since a c hange of price in some later markets will normally destroy the equilibria established in previous markets. But Walras argued that the change in a good's own price will have a more signicant impact on its excess demand than the change in other goods' prices. The own price adjustment goes directly to zero excess demand, whereas the indirect inuences of other price changes may increase or decrease demand for the good, and may e v en cancel each other out. Hence, Walras argued, it is probable that after each round, the prices are closer to equilibrium than before. Eventually, in this story, all markets will clear.
Walras's intuition is correct only in particular circumstances, as a series of studies in the century following his original speculation have told us. In an early investigation of the problem, Hicks (1948) observed that the tendency toward equilibrium depends on the shapes of demand functions near the equilibrium point. Samuelson (1947) provided the rst comprehensive mathematical formulation of the price-adjustment process and associated notion of equilibrium stability. H o wever, this formulation diers from Walras's original vision in several respects. In Samuelson's now-standard version of tatonnement, competitive agents receive a price signal, and report their excess demands at these prices to the central auctioneer. The auctioneer then adjusts the prices incrementally in proportion to the magnitude of excess demands, and announces the new incrementally adjusted price level. In each round, agents recalculate their excess demands upon receiving the newly adjusted price signal, and report these to the central auctioneer. The process continues until the prices nally converge to an equilibrium. (Often this process is formalized as a continuous rather than a discrete adjustment, so that it can be described by dierential equations and Lyapunov methods applied to prove stability results.)
This particular formulation of tatonnement, along with some minor variants, was extensively studied in the 1950s and 1960s (Arrow & Hahn 1971) . The results most relevant in our computational context are those on global stability. Of particular importance is the demonstration by Arrow, et al. (1959) that gross substitutability (GS) is sucient for a tatonnement process to be globally stable. Gross substitutability holds when the aggregate demand for each good is nondecreasing in the prices of other goods. Under this condition, the equilibrium is also unique. 2 A somewhat more general sucient condition for global stability is that the aggregate excess demand functions satisfy the weak axiom of revealed p r eference (WARP) (see the aforementioned textbooks, or Takayama (1985) , for example). 3 1.2. Non-Tatonnement Processes Many economists criticize the tatonnement explanation of how to reach general equilibrium as too far away from the actual price formation processes that seem to operate in real economies. They are especially unhappy about the fact that tatonnement does not allow agents to trade until an equilibrium has been reached. In an alternate approach, the so-called non-tatonnement process, agents are allowed to trade before the economy has reached equilibrium (although irreversible consumption and production of goods are typically prohibited). The Edgeworth and Hahn processes are two examples of non-tatonnement approaches (Takayama 1985) . In dening such processes, rules specifying under what conditions trade should happen are typically provided, but there is often no precise specication of how the trading process is actually conducted before equilibrium is reached. One nice feature of non-tatonnement pure exchange processes is that they are usually more stable than tatonnement processes. Fisher (1983) provides an extensive discussion of non-tatonnement processes.
If one is interested in general equilibrium for purposes of implementing decentralized resource allocation, then the objection that tatonnement is not an accurate description of observed price-formation processes is not crucial. Nevertheless, an ability to transact out of equilibrium can be advantageous if the time required to reach equilibrium is prohibitive. However, these advantages come with some drawbacks. Non-tatonnement processes may be subject to more strategic interactions, as transient prices become consequential to participating agents. This may reduce the modularity of the system, but the promise of more robust stability might prove to be a worthwhile tradeo. Another serious concern is that irreversible decisions (particularly in production) before prices are in equilibrium may lead to inecient resource allocations. The tentative quality of tatonnement makes it a more conservative, if somewhat less dynamic, approach.
Distributed Implementation
One important property common to both tatonnement and non-tatonnement processes is that they are amenable to straightforward distributed implementation. Although the traditional tatonnement process is often described as if there were a central auctioneer, the price update is typically separable across goods, and therefore nothing is lost by decentralizing the auctioneering process. This is in contrast to other prevalent methods for computing competitive equilibria, namely xed-point (Scarf 1973; Shoven, Whalley, & Wiegard 1992) and mathematical programming approaches (e.g., (Zhao & Dafermos 1991) ), which generally require direct examination of the joint price space. Centralization is not necessarily a drawback for the problems to which these algorithms are usually applied: solution of a general-equilibrium model to examine issues such as tax or trade policy . In most applied general equilibrium mod-4 John Q. Cheng and Michael P. W ellman eling, the system being modeled is distributed, but the analysis itself need not be.
For other applications, however, distribution of the computation is important. Such is the case when modeling the actual price-formation process of an economy, or (as in our case), when the purpose is to solve resource-allocation problems within a distributed computational environment. For these purposes, two levels of decentralization are important. First, at the auction level (or more generally, the institution level), we w ould like to decompose the market across commodities. For tatonnement and non-tatonnement processes, this means operating separate markets for each good. Decomposition obviously reduces dimensionality and simplies each auction's task.
Second, at the agent level, w e w ould like to bound the information scope of each agent to its own preferences or technology, and the decision scope of each agent to its own consumption or production. In the framework of mechanism design, decentralization constraints of this sort are typically formalized in terms of privacy preservation and informational eciency (Campbell 1987; Hurwicz 1977) , and the competitive mechanism is characterized as a maximally distributed mechanism in these terms. Agent-level decentralization generally enhances modularity of the overall system, and is often necessary to reect an existing authority or information structure.
In the next section, we describe an approach to distributed resource allocation based on general equilibrium. We h a v e e m bodied this approach in a system, called walras, that is designed to facilitate the construction and implementation of computational economies based on the competitive mechanism. Our focus in this article is on the underlying algorithm that walras employs to derive general equilibria.
The Walras Algorithm
The walras system is designed to provide a computational environment based on the basic concepts of general equilibrium theory. The system supports the two standard types of agents, consumers and producers. Consumers are dened by their preferences and endowments, and producers by their technology. Both types are assumed to be rational, competitive agents, maximizing utility or prots subject to feasibility at the given price level.
The system supports these agent t ypes by providing computational building blocks for programming agent behaviors, based on maximization with respect to specied preferences or technologies. At its core the system also provides a distributed bidding protocol and price adjustment procedure, which together comprise the walras algorithm. In this section we describe this algorithm in detail, and its connection to some related work. 5 2.1. Overview In the walras system the actions taken by consumers and producers are coordinated by auctioneers whose jobs are to clear their respective markets. There is a one-to-one correspondence between auctions and goods.
Upon receiving a randomly chosen initial price vector, each agent computes the demand function for each o f t h e g o o d s i t i s i n terested in. Consumers are interested in anygoodmentioned in their utility functions (including any with nonzero endowments), and producers are interested in any good mentioned in their technologies. Each demand function species the net quantity demanded of a good (which for a net supply is negative) as a function of its price, assuming that the prices for the remaining goods remains constant. The agents then send these single-good demand functions|the bids|to the respective auctioneers for each good.
Each auction, upon receiving the bids from all agents, computes the clearing price, which is the point at which the aggregate excess demand is zero. The auctions then notify the bidders of the new price. Upon seeing new prices, the consumers and producers will compute revised demand functions as necessary based on these new prices, and send these updated bids to the auctions.
This process continues until the prices no longer change (or the change of prices are within a pre-specied threshold). Then the process terminates, and walras reports the nal state of the price vector as the equilibrium price vector.
The Asynchronous Bidding Protocol
An important feature of the walras bidding process is that it is asynchronous. That is, at any particular time, agents are not necessarily bidding on the same goods or computing their demands based on the same state of price information. Rather, each agent maintains its own queue of goods for which to compute revised bids, and processes new price information as it is received from the auctions.
In a distributed computing environment, the asynchrony of agents' bidding behavior is completely unconstrained. In our implementation of walras on a single computational process, 3 we realize a more restricted form of asynchrony b y introducing randomness into the bidding process. Because it takes time to compute and transmit a bid, simultaneous transmission of all bids by all agents would not be an accurate model. Therefore, in our simulated system we poll the agents, allowing each to submit a random number of bids on each iteration.
Formally, let there be k goods and n agents. At a n y particular time t, agent i submits some number of bids for a subset of the goods. We assume that the number 6 John Q. Cheng and Michael P. W ellman of new bids in any period is determined by a random draw. 4 There is a distinct draw for each agent a t e a c h time period. The draws are independent across time and across agents. When an agent does not submit a bid for a good, its demand is simply carried over by the auction from the last period.
If it has a chance to submit, the bid agent i submits to auction j at time t is x j i (p j ; p t 1 j ), a function of p j , the price of good j, parametrized by p t 1 j , the price of the other goods according to information available to the agent at time t 1.
If agent i has not submitted a new bid to auction j for s j i (t) periods prior to the current time t, w e denote the eective bid for this agent, good, and time as x j i (p j ; p t s j i ( t ) j ). For the general case where the agent might or might not submit a new bid, we can express this eective bid as
In this expression, the coecient b j i (t) is an indicator that takes the value 0 if i submits a new bid for good j at t, and 1 otherwise. The rst term in the square bracket is the bid that agent i would submit to auction j based on the information s j i (t 1) + 1 periods before t (or s j i (t 1) periods before t 1). This is the old bid retained by the auction if no update is called for by the system.
Another way to write this is
or simply x j i (p j ; p t s j i ( t ) j ), where s j i (t) = b j i ( t 1 s j i ( t 1)) + (1 b j i (t)):
Note that throughout we take one period as the minimum possible delay.
One virtue of introducing asynchrony i n to the price adjustment process is that it tends to reduce price oscillations caused by simultaneous reactions by agents to the same delayed information (Wellman 1993) . By randomizing the bidding, dierent agents tend to bid on dierent goods in a given period. That is, we t ypically have b j i 6 = b j i 0 for i 6 = i 0 , and consequently dierent delays, s j i (t) 6 = s j i 0 (t).
Asynchrony among auctions is a feature that is buried in the continuous version of the tatonnement process. Although it is usually not stressed, in the translation from a dierence-equation formalization of tatonnement to a dierential formalization, the simultaneity (among auctions) is lost (see Huberman and Glance (1993) for a discussion). Fig. 1 . Convergence of the walras algorithm on one hundred randomly generated exchange economies. Note that with seven goods, it takes seven cycles on average for each agent to complete an entire round of bidding.
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Experimental Results
We h a v e implemented this algorithm in the walras system and have run it on numerous computational economies. Figure 1 presents some representative experimental results. We ran one hundred randomly generated exchange economies, each with seven goods and seven consumers. The consumers were given randomly generated endowments and preferences represented by the CES (constant elasticity o f substitution) utility function,
For these experiments we set = 0 : 5 and randomly generated the j coecients from a uniform distribution. Note that these settings ensure that the gross substitutes assumption is satised for this example. Figure 1 plots the median total excess demand, as a function of t, the bidding cycle index. Our measure of total excess demand is the sum of absolute excess demand for each g o o d . ( F or comparison, note that the economies averaged approximately 220 units of endowed goods.) As we can see from the gure, the excess demand drops precipitously in the rst few cycles, as the agents submit their initial bids. Convergence continues rapidly in the early iterations (a constant slope on the log-scale plot), beginning to level o at around 150 cycles.
Relation to Tatonnement and Other Algorithms
The process generated by walras is similar to the tatonnement process, and particularly resemblant o f W alras's original vision. In walras, there is one auctioneer for each good's market. Each auctioneer receives information from consumers and producers on one good, and it adjusts the price only for that particular good to reduce the excess demand for it. No auctioneer has to worry about interactions among dierent markets, such a s h o w the changes in the price of one good will aect the excess demand of another good. It is in this sense that walras is decentralized at the good or auction level. It is of course also decentralized at the agent level, as agents are concerned exclusively with their own consumption or production. Both forms of decentralization are useful (often essential) in practice, providing the two sources of distributivity and modularity in the system (Wellman 1995) .
As we h a v e previously (Wellman 1993 ) pointed out, walras diers from the traditional tatonnement procedure in two basic ways:
1. Agents send excess demand functions rather than single quantity points at a particular price, and 2. the auction adjusts individual prices to clear each market, rather than just adjusting the whole price vector incrementally. In practice, sending a whole curve is not much more complicated than sending just a point, since a curve can be eectively approximated by a n umber of points. And, as we discuss in Section 5, we can also accommodate hybrid methods, where curves are built up incrementally from a sequence of point bids. The analysis in terms of entire demand functions which w e pursue below a v oids some complications that occur when dealing with points accumulated from dierent time periods.
The market-by-market approach employed by walras is called progressive equilibration by Dafermos and Nagurney (1989) , in which i t w as applied to a transportation network equilibrium problem. This method was also used in Eydeland and Nagurney (1989) , where a collection of non-interacting markets with linear demand and cost structures were studied. These are essentially partial equilibrium models which could be reformulated as quadratic programming problems, as pointed out by the authors. Walras uses this method to approach a collection of markets which are inherently interdependent. The progressive equilibration approach also bears some similarity to Hicks's notion of perfect stability (Hicks 1948) , which itself is patterned more after Walras's tatonnement concept than its more modern formalizations.
Reiter and Simon (1992) studied a decentralized approach for the case where the equations that describe the equilibrium are linear. For this special case, their method requires a particularly small message space. Murphy and Mudrageda (1994) investigated the problem of decomposing largescale equilibrium models composed of linear-program submodels. Their work focus-9 es on issues arising from models made up of heterogeneous components. In subsequent w ork (1995), they describe a method of constructing a series of approximate supply curves that, when combined with exact demand models determines a sequence of points that converge to the equilibrium.
Some other related work is described in previous writings (Wellman 1993 ).
Convergence of the Walras Algorithm
In this section, we show that the price adjustment process generated by walras converges to the unique competitive equilibrium, under conditions of an exchange economy with strictly convex preferences and gross substitutability b e t w een goods. The result here also extends to productive economies satisfying the gross substitutability (GS) assumption. The assumption of GS is essential for the proof, although we h a v e found experimentally that convergence is often obtained even when it is violated.
Basic Setting
Our argument is based on the adaptive-learning framework of Milgrom and Roberts (1991) . We start by formulating the price-adjustment process as a game, with auctions as players and agents mechanically following the rules of competitive behavior.
Let the k auctions play a game where each sets the price of its own good, that is, auction j sets p j . Let p be the k-vector of prices, where each component p j is restricted (without loss of generality) to the interval [0; 1]. Let Q j (p) be the true aggregate excess demand function for good j, that is, the total demand summed over all n agents. As mentioned above, we assume strictly convex preferences and GS.
We dene the payo function, j , for auction j as follows: j j Q j ( p j ; p j ) j : W e assume Q j (1; p j ) < 0 and Q j (0; p j ) > 0.
With this payo function, a competitive equilibrium of the n agents is also an equilibrium for this game among the k auctions. By our assumption that all agents' preferences are strictly convex, such a competitive equilibrium exists. Under this same assumption, any equilibrium for the game must have zero excess demand for each good, and so the game equilibria and competitive equilibria of the economy coincide exactly.
Note that the consumers do not enter this game explicitly; they simply behave as price-takers and submit their bids accordingly. There is no strategic interaction between these consumer agents and auctions in our game here. The interesting interaction arises in how auctions formulate their expectations about other auctions' strategies. Our goal is to prove that if auctions behave exactly according to the rules in walras, their interaction will yield a convergent price adjustment process leading to an equilibrium for the game, and hence a competitive equilibrium for the economy.
Adaptive Learning
To proceed with the argument, we m ust rst introduce and discuss several useful concepts from Milgrom and Roberts (1991) . The following terminology and notation is drawn from that work. Let S j be the set of pure strategies of player j, and let (S j ) denote the set of mixed strategies over S j . The joint strategy space, S, is the cross product of the player strategy spaces, Q j S j . DEFINITION 1. For > 0, a strategy j 2 S j is -dominated by another strategy 0 j 2 (S j ), if for all 00 j 2 S j , j ( j ; 00 j ) + < j ( 0 j ; 00 j ). DEFINITION 2. Given T S, the set U j (T) is the set of pure strategies in S j that are not -dominated when the other players are limited to pure or mixed strategies over T j . U (T) = Q j U j ( T ). DEFINITION 3. U m (S) is the mth iterate of U (S), that is, U m (S) = U ( S ) m = 0 U ( U ( m 1) (S)) m 1: DEFINITION 4. U 01 (S) T 1 m=1 U m (S) is the serially undominated strategy set. DEFINITION 5. A sequence of strategies f j (t)g is consistent with adaptive learning by player j if and only if (i) 8 > 0 ;8 t; 9 t; 8t t; j (t) 2 U j (f(s) : t s t g ) A sequence of strategy proles (t) is consistent with adaptive learning if each j (t) has the property. This denition roughly means that a sequence (t) is consistent with adaptive learning if each player can eventually justify its choice in terms of other players' past play. Milgrom and Roberts (1991) point out that this denition of adaptive learning is very inclusive. It includes best-response dynamics, ctitious play, and many other policies. Now let us take a closer look at auction j's payo at time t: j (t) = Q j ( p t j ; p t j ) = n X i =1
x j i (p t j ; p t j ) walconv.tex; 12/07/1995; 15:06; no v.; p.11
From the simultaneous-play nature of our game, auction j does not know p t j at time t. Since it does know p t 1 j , one natural way for auction j to play i s t o u s e x j i ( p t j ; p t 1 j ) to forecast x j i (p t j ; p t j ). However, since in the walras algorithm agents do not submit new bids every iteration, auction j does not have all the demand information x j i (p t j ; p t 1 j ) either. Alternately, w e could assume that walras auctions know the functional forms x j i (p j ; p j ), that is, the agents' true demand functions, but not the price vector (p j ; p j ). Then the task for the auctions is to forecast the price vector p t at time t, and determine their optimal response. (This price vector p t will be common knowledge only at time t + 1 or later.) Before considering the fully asynchronous walras algorithm, let us enumerate some simpler cases: Auction j believes that other auctions will play a t a n y time t the vector price p t s0 j , where s 0 is a constant. Auction j believes that other auctions will play a t a n y time t the vector price p t sj j , where s j is a constant for j and s j < t . Auction j at any time t uses a stationary probabilistic forecast, for example, at any time t, auction j believes that with probability j h , other auctions will play p t s j h j , where P k h=1 j h = 1, and s j h < t for all h.
These forecasting methods can be shown to induce strategies consistent with adaptive learning. One common feature across all of these algorithms is that although dierent auctions may use dierent information, there is no informational discrepancy among the agents communicating demands to the auctions. That is, the same enters each term x j i (p j ; p j ) for all i. This condition is violated by the walras algorithm, which is asynchronous at the agent level.
Asynchrony: A Limited Case
A v ery important feature of the walras algorithm is that within each auction, the demand functions collected from dierent agents might be based on price information from dierent periods of time. Because the agents do not typically have the opportunity to send their most up-to-date bids to all the auctions, some of the bids that the auctions receive are not based on the updated information. More importantly, bids from dierent agents do not typically reect the same amount of delay. Put another way, agents behave as if they have discrepancies in price information.
In walras, auction j sets p t j , so that n X i=1 x j i (p t j ; p t s j i ( t ) j ) = 0
It is easy to see that dierent agents (indexed by i) will, in general, have dierent perception of p j .
The processes generated by walras are indeed consistent with adaptive learning, as we show in Section 3.5. But before considering the full-blown algorithm, we consider a simpler case with only two agents. This allows us to focus on the basic issue of asynchrony, without bringing in all of the details required for the general situation.
Consider a simple economy with k goods, but only two agents. Let the perceived excess demand function Z j be dened by Z j (p j ; t ) x j 1 ( p j ; p t 1 j ) + x j 2 ( p j ; p t 2 j ) : Here we allow agents to have dierent perceptions of p j . Agent 1's information has a time lag of one, agent 2's a time lag of two. (Neither the number of agents nor these arbitrarily chosen time lags are crucial to our result.)
We w ould like to show that if each auction sets prices such that perceived excess demand Z j (p j ; t ) is zero, the sequence of vector prices fp t g will converge to the unique equilibrium price vector. The rst step, which w e accomplish in this section, is to show that such a sequence is consistent with adaptive learning.
At time t, auction j selectsp j (t) such that x j 1 (p j (t); p t 1 j ) + x j 2 (p j (t); p t 2 j ) = 0 : DEFINITION 6. If y and z are two k-dimensional vectors, then y _ z ( Given the assumption of gross substitutability, w e h a v e, x j 1 (p j (t); a t j ) + x j 2 (p j (t); a t j )0 x j 1 (p j (t); b t j ) + x j 2 (p j (t); b t j )0 Because the functions x j i are continuous in all arguments, there must exist a 2 [0; 1], such that [x j 1 (p j (t); b t j ) + x j 2 (p j (t); b t j )] + [ x j 1 (p j (t); a t j ) + x j 2 (p j (t); a t j )](1 ) = 0 : (2) Thereforep j (t) is a best response to a mixed strategy supported by a t j and b t j . Such a mixed strategy species that each player other than j plays their walconv.tex; 12/07/1995; 15:06; no v.; p.13 WALRAS Algorithm 13 component of strategy a t j with probability 1 and that of strategy b t j with probability .
Neither a t j nor b t j represents collectively the actions by the other auctions at any time in the past, but each component o f a t j or b t j is an actual past play b y one of the auctions other than j at a particular time in the past.
In other words, the components of a t j and b t j are other players' actions which possibly occurred at dierent times in the past. Therefore they are within the past plays set dened by fp(s) : s < t g n Y j =1 fp j (s) : s < t g which is the cartesian product set of all players' actual past plays sets. It has to be true thatp j 2 U j (fp(s) : s < t g ) ; since otherwisep j will be an -dominated strategy, but an -dominated strategy cannot be a best response to a mixed strategy prole of other players. Therefore we can conclude that this price-setting strategy is consistent with adaptive learning.
More rigorously, fp j (t)g is consistent with adaptive learning i 8 > 0 ; 8 t; 9 t; 8t t; p j (t) 2 U j (fp(s) : t s t g ) : W e v erify that fp j (t)g indeed satises this denition. Fix any > 0, for anyt, 9 t =t + 2. Since we already know thatp j (t) is a best response to a mixed strategy of a t j and b t j , which are mixes of plays by auctions other than j at times t 1 and t 2, hence 8t t =t + 2 ;p j ( t ) 2 U j ( f p ( s ) : t 2 s t g ) U j ( f p ( s ) : t s t g ) The last inclusion comes from the fact that t 2 t. T h us by denition, fp j (t)g is consistent with adaptive learning.
Strategic Complementarity
The assumption of gross substitutability serves three purposes in our argument. First, it guarantees the uniqueness of competitive equilibrium (Varian 1992) . Second, it ensures that an auction's strategy is a best response to a mixed strategy of past plays (that is, Equation (2) holds for some ). Third, it establishes that the price-setting game exhibits strategic complementarity (Milgrom & Shannon 1994) . DEFINITION 7. A game exhibits strategic complementarity i for every player j, 1. the strategy space S j is a compact lattice, 2. the payo function j (p j ; p j ) is upper semi-continuous in p j and continuous in p j , and 3. j (p j ; p j ) is quasi-supermodular in p j and satises the single crossing property in (p j ; p j ).
For our game, the strategy space for each player is the unit interval, and hence the rst condition is easily satised. The second condition follows from the continuity of the excess demand functions given strictly convex preferences.
The third condition relies on two concepts|quasi-supermodularity and the single crossing property|dened by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . In our case these properties hold by virtue of the total ordered strategy space and GS. 5 The technical details are omitted for brevity.
The following two theorems are from Milgrom and Roberts (1991) . THEOREM 8 (Milgrom and Roberts Theorem 11) . Consider a game with strategic complementarities. Let PNE denote the set of pure Nash equilibrium proles. Then,
[U 01 (S) ] = [ PN E ] ;
where [T] f 2 S j inf(T) sup(T)g: THEOREM 9 (Milgrom and Roberts Theorem 7). Suppose U 01 (S) = f g . Then k (t) k ! 0 i f(t)g is consistent with adaptive learning.
First, our game is one with strategic complementarities, and it has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is also the unique competitive equilibrium of our exchange economy, due to the GS assumption. By Theorem 8, the serially undominated set is a singleton that contains only the unique Nash equilibrium.
Second, Theorem 9 states that if the serially undominated set is a singleton, then any adaptive learning process will eventually converge to the element in that singleton. Since fp j (t)g is consistent with adaptive learning for any k, fp(t)g is also consistent with adaptive learning, hence it converges to the unique equilibrium price vector.
The Walras Algorithm
Finally, w e consider the full walras algorithm. Dene Z j (p j ; t ) n X i =1
x j i (p j ; p t s j i ( t ) j ) ; where s j i (t) 0 is the delay of information for agent i in market j at time t. I f agent i's most recent update for its jth bid is based on the information it has at time t s, then the delay is simply s. Let r j i (t) t s j i (t):
We can then write Z j (p j ; t ) = n X i =1
x j i (p j ; p r j i ( t ) j ) :
Note that r j i (t) t 1;
since the smallest possible delay i s 1 .
A t time t, auction j selectsp j (t) such that,
By an argument strictly analogous to that of Section 3.3, we know thatp j (t) i s a best response to a mixed strategy of a t j and b t j . This also means that auction j's plaŷ p j ( t ) is a best response to strategies played by other auctions at times r j i (t); i = 1 ; : : : ; n . PROPOSITION 10. 8t;8i; 9 _ t i ; r j i ( _ t i ) >t. Proof. Fix i. Pick a n ŷ t , lett =t + 2 . A t t , there are two possibilities. One is r j i (t) = t 1 = t + 1. In this case, our proposition is true immediately. The second situation is r j i (t) <t 1. In this case, the bid to auction j by agent i has not been updated. Suppose that this bid is in the queue with m steps left before it will be called. At each time v walras draws a number d v randomly from f0; 1; 2g. The position of our bid in the queue will move forward d v steps. Since m is a nite positive i n teger, it is conceivable that eventually the bid's position in the queue will be zero and then it will be updated, unless walras draws 0 every time, which i s a n e v ent with probability zero. When our bid is updated after t 0 periods|that is, at timet + t 0 |we h a v e r j i ( t + t 0 ) = t + t 0 1 > t 1 > t . Again, our proposition holds with probability one.
In fact, if walras draws from a set such a s f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g instead of f0; 1; 2g, w e can say that this proposition is true for sure.
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John Q. Cheng and Michael P. W ellman Let us check that fp j (t)g is consistent with adaptive learning. Let t = max i ft i g. Now, 8 > 0 ; 8 t , there exists a t, such that 8t > t , 8 i , w e h a v e r j i ( t ) > t . Hence all components of a t j and b t j occurred between timet and t. Therefore, sincep j (t) is a best response to a mixed strategy supported by a t j and b t j , it belongs to the set fp(s) : t s t g . This is the same as saying 8 > 0 ;8 t; 9 t; 8t > t;p j (t) 2 U j (fp(s) : t s t g ) ; so fp j (t)g is consistent with adaptive learning.
Thus, fp j (t)g is consistent with adaptive learning for all j = 1 ; : : : ; k . Again by the theorems in the last subsection, fp(t)g converges to the unique equilibrium position with probability one. Thus practically every actual price adjustment process run by walras converges to the unique equilibrium.
Relaxing Gross Substitutability
Gross Substitutability
As we h a v e shown above, when commodities are gross substitutes, the processes generated by walras converges to a competitive equilibrium. However, the GS requirement is quite restrictive. We w ould like to be able to establish more relaxed conditions under which the algorithm converges.
First, let us consider a very simple special case. Suppose we h a v e k goods and n consumers in an exchange economy, all of them with the same CES preferences.
As noted in Equation (1) Note that here x j i is a function of price and endowment v ectors. The cross-price derivative of this demand function, for j 6 = l, i s @x j i @p l = p r 1 j h e l i P k m=1 p r m r p r 1 l P k m=1 p m e m i i P k m=1 p r m 2 :
(3)
If @x j i @pl > 0, then good j is a gross substitute for good l. F rom Equation (3), it is clear that this relationship holds given the following: 
If r < 0, then (4) holds, provided that all prices are positive, and each consumer starts with strictly positive endowment in at least one good. Since r = 1 , r < 0 is equivalent t o 0 < < 1, given that 2 ( 1; 1). Thus, r < 0 (or > 0) gives us a sucient condition for gross substitutability for CES agents. However, even if r > 0 (or < 0), it is still possible that the rst term in (4) dominates the second term, especially when jrj is small, which implies that is negative but close to zero.
Another possibility is that condition (4) be violated for some consumers, but still hold in the aggregate. This aggregate substitutability condition is what we really need for the algorithm's convergence Let E j = P n i=1 e j i be the aggregate endowment level in good j. W e then have, for j 6 = l, Again, we can see that r < 0 guarantees this inequality. When r < 0 but jrj is small, (5) is still likely to hold. The inequality (5) is equivalent t o p l E l P k j =1 p j E j > p r l r P k j=1 p r j :
The rst term is the value of good l divided by the value of all goods; the second term does not appear to have such a simple interpretation. It is interesting to note that if we sum the above inequality across all goods, we get r < 1, which i s implied by 2 ( 1; 1). So the aggregation of (6) across all goods must be true, even though it might not hold for individual goods. This CES exchange example illustrates some issues concerning gross substitutability. If agents' demand functions satisfy GS, then the market demand function will automatically satisfy GS as well. On the other hand, even if agents' demand functions do not always satisfy GS, it is still possible to have the market demand function satisfy GS. Since it is the market demand that counts, we often achieve convergence even when individual agents violate the substitutability conditions.
More Experimental Evidence
The experimental results presented in Section 2.3 were based on CES consumers with a xed substitution coecient = 0 : 5. From the CES utility function (Equation (1)), we know that when 0 < < 1, both the individual and the market demand functions exhibit gross substitutability. Therefore, walras always converges for these examples.
In order to explore situations where convergence is not guaranteed, we randomly generated a range of CES exchange economies with negative values. Specically, we v aried from +0:5 t o 10, with a step size of 0:25. For each value, we randomly generated two v e-good economies, one with ve consumers and the other with seven. The j coecients and consumer endowments were randomly generated. Figure 2 presents our results. The vertical axis indicates the number of bidding cycles for each economy to converge. The horizontal axis indicates the values of .
There were nine economies that did not converge at all after 5000 cycles (not shown in the gure). All of these were seven-consumer economies with 2. In the gure, black dots indicate that the experimental run converged to the equilibrium for the economy, and white dots indicate that the run converged, but to a nonequilibrium state.
The experiment suggests that for small negative v alues of , the randomly gen- These results suggest possible convergence when is negative but with a small absolute value. Our theoretical investigation in Section 4.1 also suggests this possibility, as the inequality (4) is more easily satised for smaller degrees of complementarity.
Notes on Aggregate Demand Functions
While the experimental results are certainly encouraging, formal results establishing convergence under a class of utility functions wider than GS is still out of reach at this time. That this is dicult is perhaps not surprising. The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (SMD) (Shafer & Sonnenschein 1982) tells us that utility maximization by each individual agent d o e s not impose any restriction on the aggregate demand function. Even if restrictions stronger than utility maximization are imposed on agents|such as homothetic preferences|there are typically still no restrictions on market demand functions.
The SMD theorem suggests that if the market demand functions are to exhibit particular properties, we are likely to need restrictions on how individuals' preferences are related to each other. F or example, one property o f i n terest is exact aggregation, where the market demand function behaves as if it were generated by some utility maximization individual. For discussions, see Muellbauer (1976) , Chipman (1974) , Hildenbrand (1983) and Kirman (1992) . The typical conditions either call for all agents to have proportional incomes or require all agents to have identical preferences.
Incremental Bidding
Recall that bids in the walras algorithm consist single-good demand functions, specifying the quantity demanded as the own price changes, keeping the remaining prices xed. This notion of bid diers from that often employed elsewhere, where agents announce only a particular demand quantity at a particular point price. Some may be concerned that the walras algorithm therefore places an undue burden on the agents, who are required to compute a one-dimensional curve rather than a zero-dimensional point.
If calculating demand curves is a serious burden, agents may in fact participate in the protocol by calculating and submitting approximate demand functions, perhaps based on tting a small numb e r o f p o i n ts. We h a v e explored a particular version of this, called incremental bidding. In incremental bidding, agents are allowed to update only one point on their bid curve at a time, rather than revising their whole demand function all at once.
The details of the scheme are as follows. A demand schedule is denoted by a n ordered set of price-quantity pairs, with linear interpolation between the specied prices. At each bidding opportunity t for good j, agent i selects a price p j to bid on, and adds the point h p j ; x j i ( p j ;p t 1 j )ito its demand schedule, wherep t is the price announced by auctions at time t. Note that at any time, the demand curve contains points based on dierent information about the other goods' prices. On adding a new point, we delete any previous points that are inconsistent with the new point and an assumption of downward-sloping demand.
If the bid prices p j are chosen systematically, agents will eventually update all the relevant information under this incremental bidding scheme. In our experiments with incremental bidding, we c hose p j = p t 1 j + , where is a random variable with a mean value of zero. On one hundred randomly generated exchange economies with ve goods and ve CES consumers (with = 0 : 5), all converged to equilibrium. 6 Since one bid in the incremental bidding protocol adds considerably less information than a usual walras bid (i.e., an entire demand function), it is not surprising that it takes walras longer to converge under incremental bidding. Specically, the incremental bidding scheme took on average about 70 times more cycles than the regular scheme to reach a total excess demand below a particular threshold. 7
Conclusion
In describing and analyzing the walras algorithm, we h a v e extended the standard tatonnement convergence results to a setting that admits asynchrony and facilitates distributed implementation. Although the rigorous convergence guarantees are limited to the classical conditions with gross substitutability, w e h a v e found empirically that the method often works when GS is violated to some degree.
By employing the general machinery of Milgrom and Roberts (1991) in our proofs, we also suggest how a v ariety of related asynchronous price-adjustment algorithms can be shown to converge. In continuing work we i n tend to explore some of the more interesting variants in bidding protocols (e.g., incremental bidding, discussed above), as well as other generalizations of the walras algorithm.
